Skip to content

makeUthink

Menu
  • Home
  • Categories
    • Philosophy
    • Politics
    • Life
    • Miscallaneous
  • Support Us
  • Explore Further
    • Books
    • Videos and Documentaries
    • Magazines and Publications
    • Affiliated Websites
  • About Us
Menu

Can God be Reconciled With Science? The Kalām Cosmological Argument

Posted on March 14, 2021March 14, 2021 by Joseph Clay
inCollage_20210301_120639523 (3)

I have spent many a quiet evening reflecting on the existence and nature of deities. Does God exist? Would there be one, many, none? And if God did exist, how could we prove it? Apparently, I’m not alone in my musings.


W.L. Craig’s search for answers to these age-old questions ultimately led him to revive an argument for God he called the kalām cosmological argument. To break down the name, a cosmological argument for God is one that tries to demonstrate God’s existence from facts about the universe’s nature; by naming it ‘kalām’ Craig is paying homage to the group of Islamic scholars the argument was previously associated with. While there have been many attempts to ‘logic God into existence’, few have been as popular as this in recent years. But does this popularity reflect its persuasiveness?


At its core, the kalām argues that something cannot be caused by nothing. More specifically, the universe cannot have been caused by nothing. This is the basis of the argument and is both intuitive and supported by modern science. According to the big bang theory, the universe did have a beginning at a fixed point in the past. At this moment, all time and matter began existing at once. We do not know, and perhaps cannot know, what, or if, anything came before the big bang. But if we hold that everything which begins to exist is caused, something must have caused it.


Contrary to those who view science and theism as incompatible, Craig’s version of the kalām would seem incomplete without any reference to the big bang theory. But more than stating something cannot be caused by nothing, the kalām also tries to demonstrate that something non-physical, consciously and without cause, i.e. something with free will, chose to create the universe at the point of the big bang. Its supporters hold that, because the laws of physics do not exist before the big bang in the scientific theory, science will not be able to adequately explain the universe’s origin, and so something with free will remains the best possible explanation. A being capable of such things would be analogous to God.


Interestingly, suggesting that there was a first historical event (such as the big bang) leaves the argument open to attack. How? One can argue that this was not the origin of all creation, but merely the furthest back in history we can investigate within an actually infinite past. In other words, there was no first point in history, and the past extends backwards in time forever. But does the concept of an actually infinite past really make sense?


While infinities are sometimes necessary in mathematical equations, they may not exist in reality. Davies lays out some problems with them by suggesting that one can express an infinite past as saying, 'it is possible that every event has a predecessor'. Put like this, he argues it could mean one of two things. Firstly, we could assume it means that the number of things that happened in the past could have been greater; that it is possible the past could have included more events. Or alternatively, it could mean it is possible that we cannot have a complete group of past events; that when we group together all of the events of the past, there could still be earlier historical events, which is paradoxical. If we take the first interpretation, it doesn't rule out the idea of there being a beginning to the universe, because it is only possible and not necessary that every event had a predecessor, so it’s not a problem for the cosmological argument. If we take the second line of thought, it doesn't make any sense; intuitively, it's impossible to group everything together and still miss some things out.


If we continue to assume, rightly or wrongly, that an infinite past is an unlikely reality, at some point there needs to be something outside of the universe that causes the universe to exist. We can therefore continue to engage with the kalām, which suggests that only something possessing free will is capable of the universe’s creation, where this something is best described as God.


Asking which particular God, or whether this God is still active in the universe today are both irrelevant to the argument. Perhaps more surprisingly, questions about the origins of God’s existence are similarly irrelevant to the argument. Anyone who has themselves argued that God caused the universe to exist, may have been asked what caused God to exist, and thus seen their argument evaporate into an endless search for a first cause. Proponents of the kalām feel able to comfortably dismiss this problem by suggesting that for something to be the best explanation it does not need to be explained itself.


Reichenbach analogises by using the example of a girl raising her hand to ask a question. For us to understand that the girl raised her hand to ask a question, we do not need to understand how wanting to ask a question led to raising her hand. Similarly, if the kalām is correct that God is the best explanation, we do not need to understand how God was caused to know God was the best explanation.


With a small proportion of some key debates considered, we are left to question whether God really is the best explanation we have for the causation of the universe. Despite the above, Oppy suggests a divine being is not. He says either, the universe was caused by God (or gods) with a non-physical form and free will, or the universe was caused by something natural. If we consider, devoid of biases, that they are both equally likely to have been the cause of the universe, he says we should not commit to the theistic point of view. Theism assumes both natural and supernatural, whereas a naturalist explanation merely assumes something that indisputably exists. On Oppy’s view, a natural explanation would require fewer assumptions, even if we have no adequate natural explanation; therefore, it would be better to adopt the naturalist point of view.


If it is true that the argument commits us to believing in something that doesn’t exist, namely something supernatural, then it would follow that the kalām cosmological argument does not work. But whether or not the kalām does commit us to something that doesn’t exist, it seems that these age-old questions still need answers.


©makeuthink.com 2020

References:

Craig, W.L. (2015) ‘The Kalam Cosmological Argument’, Reasonable Faith, available at https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/popular-writings/existence-nature-of-god/the-kalam-cosmological-argument/, accessed 19th February 2021.


Davies, B. (2004) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion: Third Edition, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 48-54.


Reichenbach, B. (2021) ‘Cosmological Argument’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/#KalaCosmArgu, accessed 19th February 2021

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Featured publications

An article published in The Fatherland Magazine Issue 2

Recent Posts

  • Defend or Decolonize? The Falklands Revisited
  • The Benefits of Cashless Society
  • Can God be Reconciled With Science? The Kalām Cosmological Argument
  • The Ugly Truth Behind UK Football Academies
  • Our Disconnect With Information
  • Why There is No Right or Wrong

Categories

  • Economics
  • Life
  • Miscallaneous
  • Philosophy
  • Politics

Archives

  • July 2021
  • May 2021
  • March 2021
  • February 2021
  • January 2021
  • December 2020
  • November 2020
  • October 2020

Tags

BLM (1) current affairs (1) Longer (1) Morality (1) Shorter (1) war (1)
©2022 makeUthink
We use cookies on our website to give you the most relevant experience by remembering your preferences and repeat visits. By clicking “Accept”, you consent to the use of ALL the cookies.
Cookie settingsACCEPT
Manage consent

Privacy Overview

This website uses cookies to improve your experience while you navigate through the website. Out of these, the cookies that are categorized as necessary are stored on your browser as they are essential for the working of basic functionalities of the website. We also use third-party cookies that help us analyze and understand how you use this website. These cookies will be stored in your browser only with your consent. You also have the option to opt-out of these cookies. But opting out of some of these cookies may affect your browsing experience.
Necessary
Always Enabled

Necessary cookies are absolutely essential for the website to function properly. This category only includes cookies that ensures basic functionalities and security features of the website. These cookies do not store any personal information.

Non-necessary

Any cookies that may not be particularly necessary for the website to function and is used specifically to collect user personal data via analytics, ads, other embedded contents are termed as non-necessary cookies. It is mandatory to procure user consent prior to running these cookies on your website.